Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Volume 10
Issue 2 Fall
Fall 1989

A New Era of Financial Futures Trading in
Germany: Sweeping Changes in the Legal and
Business Environment
Friedrich E.F. Hey

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the Banking and Finance Commons, Foreign Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and
the Securities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Friedrich E.F. Hey, A New Era of Financial Futures Trading in Germany: Sweeping Changes in the Legal and Business Environment,
10 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 281 (1989-1990)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

A New Era of Financial Futures Trading
in Germany: Sweeping Changes in the
Legal and Business Environment
Friedrich E.F. Hey*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Trading in futures has increased dramatically in recent years. This
is especially true for financial futures. The two main reasons for this
'phenomenon are: (1) there is a greater need for hedging against price
fluctuations; and (2) financial futures trading provides speculators with
the opportunity to transform favorable price developments into quick
and large profits.
Futures exchanges now operate in many countries. In Europe, the
most notable exchange is the London International Financial Futures
Exchange ("LIFFE"), but the trend towards opening new exchanges
continues. For example, the "Soffex" opened in Zurich in May 1988,
and Dublin opened its own exchange in May 1989.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the evolution of a futures exchange was prevented for many years by extremely restrictive legislation
dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century. In order to
strengthen the position of Frankfurt as one of the world's financial centers, and to reclaim some of the business that has moved to London over
the years, the German parliament enacted new legislation in June 1989
which substantially changed the legal situation with respect to futures
trading. In the wake of this more lenient legislation, a German futures
exchange, the Deutsche Terminbbrse ("DTB"), began trading in January
1990.
This Article examines the recently enacted legislation governing fu*
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tures trading in the Federal Republic of Germany, distinguishes the new
law from the old, and analyzes the impact the new legislation will have
on the functioning of the new German futures exchange.
II.

FINANCIAL FUTURES AND THEIR ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE

Many types of financial futures currently are traded on the world's
futures exchanges.I The most important types, in terms of contracts and
public demand, are interest rate futures, stock index futures, bond futures, and currency futures. The increase in the economic importance of
financial futures trading is underscored by the trading volume of these
futures. Total futures trading volume increased more than tenfold between 1970 and 1985, with financial futures accounting for 60% of the
total trading.2 The LIFFE, for example, doubled its trading volume each
year from its opening in September 1982 through 1987.1
The principal economic role of a financial future is to protect against
fluctuations in the prices of the underlying financial instrument.4 In so
doing, financial futures satisfy an important need for enterprises desiring
to lock in prices. This function has become even more important in light
of the enormous volatility experienced in financial markets in recent
years. Futures contracts on currencies, or "forward transactions," have
long been used to protect against fluctuations in certain currencies. Unlike the newer currency futures, these forward contracts are not based on
standardized terms.
Other types of financial futures have emerged more recently. In
1982, the first stock index futures were introduced. These futures have
been enormously successful, as is demonstrated by the continually increasing number of varieties that are available. Interest rate futures, another important financial instrument, were first traded on the Chicago
Board of Trade in October 1975.'
As previously stated, the basic economic purpose of financial futures
is to secure against price fluctuations in the underlying financial instrument. This function will become even more important in the future as
institutional investors, namely pension funds and life insurance companies, seek to secure the value of their enormous portfolios against drastic
I For a detailed description of the various types of futures, see M. POWERS & D. VOGEL, INSIDE THE FINANCIAL FUTURES MARKETS (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter M. POWERS & D. VOGEL].
2 P.M. JOHNSON, FUTURES MARKETS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE AEI STUDIES, at ix (1986).

3 Dickins, FUTURES, Oct. 1988, at 22.
4 COOPERS & LYBRAND, A GUIDE TO FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 104 (1984) (Euromoney

Publication).
5 M. POWERS & D. VOGEL, supra note 1, at 13.
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plunges in the financial markets. 6 The October 1987 crash resolved any
remaining doubts as to the necessity of such behavior. Thus, financial
futures will continue to play an important economic function by alleviating the consequences of such price plunges.
III. THE EMERGING GERMAN FINANCIAL FUTURES EXCHANGE
The new German financial futures exchange known as the DTB is
located in Frankfurt, the German financial center. It will soon offer contracts on a German stock index ("DAX")7 and on a German federal
government bond. Currently, only stock options like those traded in the
United States are offered. 8 The DTB works on a fully computerized basis, which means that trading is conducted via computer terminals which
are linked to the central computer of the DTB.9
The Soffex in Zurich (one of Frankfurt's chief competitors for financial services business) operates in a similar fashion.' Allegedly, the Soffex has had great success thus far." In addition to the Soffex in Zurich
and the LIFFE in London (Frankfurt's other major European competitor for financial services business), Paris operates its own exchange
known as the "MATIF." The MATIF began trading in February 1986
with success that exceeded the expectations of its promoters. 1 2 The MATIF's trading volume expanded from 1.6 million contracts in 1986 to
12.0 million contracts in 1987, thus making it the most successful new
exchange in 1987.13 This success continued in 1988 and 1989, generally
speaking, given the MATIF's trading volume for those years.
As to the position of foreign banks at the DTB, there has been no
apparent disadvantageous treatment accorded them thus far. Indeed,
foreign banks may actively participate in the DTB. 4 A definitive answer
6 For a good overview of the uses of financial futures by institutional investors, see S.FIGLEWSKI, J.KosE, & J. MERRICK, HEDGING WITH FINANCIAL FUTURES FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (1986); von Rosen, Terminkontrakie sind Uberfdiig, 1989

KREDrrWESEN 308, 312 [hereinafter von Rosen].
7 For further information regarding the DAX, see von Rosen, Der DAX und die Deutsche
Terminbrse DTB, 1988 KREDITWESEN 743.
8 For a detailed description of these products, see Kindermann, Rechtliche Strukturen derDeutschen Terminbrse, WERTPAPIERMITrEILUNGEN [hereinafter WM], Sonderbeilage 2 1989, at 6
[hereinafter Kindermann].

9 Id. at 9.
10 Forstmoser & Pulver, DER OPTIONSHANDEL IN DER SCHWEIZ, WM,SONDERBEILAGE 6
1988, at 3.
I Id. at 14.
12 See Advertisement by MATIF, FUTURES, Jan. 1988, at 9.
13 FUTURES, No. 13, 1988, at 125.
14 This was the reponse to a questionnaire sent out by this author in March 1989 to the Association of Foreign Banks in Germany (Verband der Auslandsbanken in Deutschland, Frankfurt).
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as to treatment of foreign banks, however, cannot be given yet. One
must watch the further developments at the DTB in order to ascertain
the actual position these banks will occupy.
The establishment of a German financial futures exchange was,
without doubt, an economic necessity. First, there is enormous profit
potential associated with the operation of the exchange. Second, and
perhaps even more importantly, an exchange in Frankfurt is necessary if
the city wants to maintain its status as one of the world's leading financial centers. A financial center without a facility for futures trading simply is incomplete in today's world, 5 and the lack of such trading
opportunities would seriously jeopardize Frankfurt's position. 16 Specifically, Frankfurt's current customers might take their business elsewhere.
The professional portfolio managers of large international investors, such
as pension and investment funds and life insurers, tend to concentrate
their activity in locations where the entire scope of financial services and
7
instruments is available.'
The trend towards globalization of financial markets and financial
services leads to international competition. It is against this global background that one must consider Frankfurt's efforts to establish a financial
futures exchange.
IV.

LEGAL TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL FUTURES TRADING IN
GERMANY: THE SITUATION PRIOR TO 1989

A.

Legislative History Regarding Futures Trading

The trading of both financial futures and commodities futures is
subject to complex legal treatment in Germany, with various, partly intertwined laws affecting these activities. From the beginning of the twentieth century, German law severely restricted futures trading. Moreover,
a great number of court decisions fortified these restrictions, and in so
doing, clearly exceeded the original scope of the legislation as intended
by the framers. This is particularly true in various decisions pertaining
to transactions by German citizens on foreign exchanges.
In describing the legal treatment of futures trading prior to the
changes enacted in 1989,18 it is necessary to take a brief look at the legislative history. This will provide the necessary background against which
the new legislation may be evaluated.
15 The trend towards globalization requires hedging opportunities. Kindermann, supra note 8,
at 4.
16 Id.; von Rosen, supra note 6, at 308.
17 Mollet, Was die Soffex dem Schweizer investor Bietet, SOFFEx NEWS, No. 2, 1989, at 1.
18 Note that the prior legal scheme still applies to commodities trading.
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Two statutes affect the trading of financial futures in Germany: Civil
Code section 764 (in conjunction with section 762),,' and the forward
trading provisions of the German law governing exchanges-the Borsengesetz.2 ° Since these provisions were designed to complement each
other, their legislative history can be considered together.
At the time the above laws were enacted, transactions in which no
physical execution was intended-and in which the difference in value
became payable at the conclusion of the transaction-were viewed by
legislators as a form of speculation. Driven by the desire to protect people from such speculation, the legislature passed laws that made such a
contract non-binding-ie., unenforceable.
There is a long and widespread tradition in European legislation to
prohibit transactions that are based on speculation. Such legislation
often was induced by times of "wild speculation., 21 Various Prussian
rulings from 1836, 1840, and 1844 were particularly directed against the
trading of futures of financial instruments because this form of trading
was concerned with only the difference between the present and the future prices, thus making it very suspect as speculation.22
The foregoing measures had rather adverse effects.2 3 First, these
laws did not stop speculation. Moreover, while most people considered it
a matter of honor to fulfill their obligations, less honorable people sought
to benefit from the unenforceability of these contracts. Consequently, the
laws barring futures trading were repealed in 1860. Thus, speculation in
this form was no longer limited, and as a result, traders and speculators
had nearly unlimited freedom.
An enormous surge in trading followed, and many of the new speculators had neither adequate experience nor adequate financial resources
to support their losses. This resulted in the financial collapse of a great
number of people.2 4 In view of this, public opinion demanded restrictions.2" It was against this background that the courts sought to interpret the laws so as to limit this type of speculation,2 6 and the legislators
19 BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] §§ 762, 764 (W. Ger).
20 B6RSENGESETZ [BbRsG] §§ 50-60 (W. Ger.).
21 H.H. Drgemiiller-Haase, Der Differenzeinwand beim Boersentermingeschaeft in der Rechtsprechung des Hanseatischen Oberlandesgerichts und des Reichsgerichts 1 (1932) (Dissertation
Marburg) [hereinafter Dr6gemiiller-Haase Dissertation].
22 Id. at 2.
23 Id. at 3.

24 Id.; see also Judgment of Oct. 28, 1899, Reichsgericht, Ger., 44 Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen
[RGZ] 103, 109.
25 Dragemiiller-Haase Dissertation, supra note 21, at 3.
26 Id at 4.
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finally enacted restrictive rules pertaining to futures trading by the end of
the nineteenth century.
With the enactment of the rules of the B6rsengesetz, the legislature
pursued two objectives: (1) to protect ordinary people from the risks of
speculation, and (2) to leave businesspeople who were aware of the risks
and needed to trade in futures for hedging purposes unaffected.27 This
legislative intent has not always .been given the necessary consideration
by courts. It should be noted, however, that the legislature clearly intended to bar only unexperienced, private individuals from futures transactions, whereas business participants were to enjoy total liberty i
futures trading.
B.

The Statutory Framework
1.

Generally

As stated above, the legal treatment of futures trading in Germany
is very complex because two interrelated statutes are involved. Both of
these statutes govern the area (although they are not totally congruent),
and both of these statutes can affect the "validity" of a transaction.
These statutes affect the validity of a futures transaction by denying the
enforceability of futures contracts. If, however, a party has actually performed its duties under a futures contract, that party cannot reclaim
what it has already transferred.
Considering the legal situation prior to the 1989 changes is not a
superfluous task. The new legislation changed the old scheme only in
part. The doctrinal structure that governs the validity of futures transaction will remain the same. For example, section 764 of the German Civil
Code will not be changed at all.2 8 Moreover, most of the former principles will continue to govern commodity futures since they have been excluded from the new liberal legislation.29 Given that the German courts
also claim jurisdiction over transactions that Germans conduct on foreign exchanges,3" which has caused furor particularly in the United
States,3 1 foreign financial institutions will continue to face the restrictive
laws when they enter into a commodity futures contract with German
27 See the legislative history as revealed in Reichstagsdrucksache 2907/1909 Nr 48, at 2602,
2609, cited in Judgment of Oct. 28, 1899, Reichsgericht, 44 RGZ 103, 109.
28 Its scope,-however, will be indirectly affected by the new section 58 in the Bdrsengesetz.
29 Bo6tsG § 53(3) (W. Ger.).
30 See infra text accompanying notes 44-81.
31 See Rogers & Markham, The Application of West German Statutes to UnitedStates Commodity Futures Contracts: An Unnecessary Clash of Policies, 19 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273 (1988)
[hereinafter Rogers & Markham].
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investors.32
2. Section 764
a.

General principles

Before turning to the practically more important provisions in the
Bbrsengesetz, this section will consider Civil Code section 764. One
should notice that section 764 is of particular importance in hedging
transactions. Section 764 (referring to Civil Code section 762) provides
that a contract shall be treated as non-binding if the parties do not intend
to actually perform their respective duties, but rather intend to "pay off"
only the difference between the price as specified in the contract and the
price on the day of delivery. The same legal consequence holds true if
only one party has the aforementioned intention and the other party
could have known this.
Moreover, it is settled law that the scope of section 764 covers all
transactions whose economic effect equals "paying off," as is the case
when the parties engage in reciprocal transactions.3 3 Aside from the
foregoing intentions, section 764 has no further requirements.3 4 Thus, its
scope is quite broad, and it obviously affects a great number of futures
transactions. Why is it, then, that section 764 has less practical importance than the provisions pertaining to futures trading in the Bbrsengesetz? Basically, there are three reasons. First, section 58 of the
B6rsengesetz bars the application of section 764 under specific circumstances which will be discussed later in this Article. Second, because it is
often difficult to prove "intent" as section 764 requires, a violation under
the Bfrsengesetz can be proven much more easily, and the result (unenforceability of the contract) is the same. 35 The third reason is described
in the following section.
b. Hedging Transactions
Historically, section 764 has been very important in financial futures
32 For a description of the probable impact of the new § 61 of the B6rsengesetz, see infra text
accompanying notes 125-33.
33 Judgment of March 16, 1981, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]l, NJW, W. Ger., 1981, 1897; WM,
1978, at 1203, 1204; WM,1972, at 178; Judgment of June 15, 1927, Reichsgericht, 117 RGZ 267,
268; Pecher in MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, § 764, remark 3

(1st ed. 1980) [hereinafter Pecher]; Hiuser in SOERrEL, KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH, § 764, remark 4 (11th ed. 1985) [hereinafter Hiuser in SOERGEL]; Kiimpel, Rechtsfragen des Differenzgeschdfts in der Bankpraxis, WM,1987, at 1321, 1322 [hereinafter Kiimpel].
34 Pecher, supra note 33, § 764, remark 7. Section 764 literally affects only transactions in
"goods" ("Waren") and "negotiable instruments" ("Wertpapiere"). The question whether financial
futures are covered will be discussed infra text accompanying note 97.
35 Id.
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transactions conducted for hedging purposes. As will be discussed in
more detail below, section 58 of the B6rsengesetz, which barred section
764 under certain circumstances, was not applicable to transactions on
foreign exchanges. Since there was no financial futures trading on German exchanges (aside from the usual forward transactions in currencies),
all parties-even businesspeople-who engaged in such transactions were
subject to the provisions of section 764.
Fairly soon after section 764 was enacted, the courts had to consider
the applicability of section 764 to hedging transactions. As noted in the
above discussion of legislative history, the objective of section 764 was to
prevent speculation. While futures transactions conducted by businesspeople for hedging purposes seemed to fulfill all the requirements of section 764, they were anything but speculative, given their objective. To
the contrary, hedging transactions are designed to protect against future
price fluctuations.
In the leading case addressing this issue, a New York broker sued a
German cotton manufacturer for payment resulting out of various cotton
futures transactions.3 6 The lower courts dismissed the claim on the
ground that section 764 made the contracts unenforceable. The Reichsgericht (then the highest German court in civil matters) reversed. It
found that although hedging transactions fell within the literal meaning
of section 764, they were beyond its intended scope of regulation. Thus,
enforcement of the futures contracts was granted. According to the
Reichsgericht, the characteristics of a hedging transaction are that it is
(economically) connected with an underlying "main transaction," and its
purpose is to secure against the risks of price fluctuations. Thus, it would
contradict legislative intent to apply section 764 under these circumstances, since the law was never designed to bar sensible economic business behavior.
The literature widely approves of this interpretation,3 7 and subsequent court decisions followed it as well. The Bundesgerichtshof (currently the highest German court in civil matters) has indicated in dicta
that it would adhere to the principles enunciated by the Reichsgericht.38
Following its leading decision on the hedge doctrine, the Reichsgericht tried to clarify it. In so doing, the court developed various indicia
which would establish presumptions against or in favor of speculative
36 Judgment of March 28, 1923, Reichsgericht, 107 RGZ 22, 24.
37 H~iuser in SOERGEL, supra note 33, § 764, remark 7; Pecher, supra note 33, § 764, remark 19;
Canaris in 3 HANDELSGESETZBUCH-GROSSKOMMENTAR (pt. 3), remark 1877 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter Canaris]; Kiimpel, supra note 33, at 1326.
38 WM, 1972, at 178, 179; and more recently in WM, 1988, at 1717, 1718 (also dicta).

German Futures Trading

10:281(1989)
objectives. The most important of these is whether or not the transaction
belongs to the ordinary course of business. 39 This doubtless was the case
in the cotton futures case discussed previously.' In another case, however, where a mortgage and insurance broker engaged in currency futures without establishing a particular business reason for it, the
Reichsgericht denied that there was a hedge transaction.4 1
Another indicium is whether the size and frequency of the alleged
hedge transactions are in line with the size of the business-that is to say,
whether they reflect business exigencies.4 2
If the foregoing tests are met, there is a presumption against speculation. That presumption, however, can be rebutted.4 3
3. B'rsengesetz Provisions
a.

Application and Scope

In order to evoke the relevant provisions of the Bbrsengesetz, a
transaction must be a "BMrsentermingeschMt."
The critical question,
therefore, is what sort of transactions are considered to be "Brsentermingeschifte." The Bundesgerichtshof's definition of a Bdrsenterminges-

chift is a contract: (1) on negotiable instruments ("Wertpapiere"), goods,
or currencies; (2) under standardized terms; (3) the contractual obligations of which need not be fulfilled immediately but rather in the fu-

ture;45 and (4) which is related to a futures market, meaning that it must

be possible to engage any time in a reciprocal transaction 46 (this is the

reason for requiring standardized terms).47 Generally, this futures mar39 Judgment of April 6, 1923, Reichswirtschaftsgericht, Juristische Wochenschrift [JW] 1923,
964, 965; Judgment of June 15, 1927, Reichsgericht, 117 RGZ 267, 269; Judgment of December 8,
1934, Reichsgericht, 146 RGZ 190, 193. See also Hopt, Kurssicherung und Differenzgeschdfte nach
764, 762 BGB (Festschrift ftr Winfried Werner) 339, 341 (1984).
40 Judgment of March 28, 1923, Reichsgericht, 107 RGZ 22.
41 Judgment of June 15, 1927, Reichsgericht, 117 RGZ 267, 270.
42 Judgment of April 6, 1923, Reichswirtschaftsgericht, JW 1923, 964, 965.
43 Judgment of December 8, 1934, Reichsgericht, 146 RGZ 190, 193; Pecher, supra note 33, at
§ 764, remark 19.
44 BORsG § 53 (W. Ger.).
45 The rationale for this is that the former requires cash, thus making these transactions less
eligible for speculation. ZIP, 1988, at 358, 359 (including criteria to distinguish one type of transaction from the other). (The transaction might fall under Civil Code § 764. See Pecher, supra note 33,
§ 764, remark 20.) The BGH has also concluded that it need not be a transaction with a firm date of
performance within the meaning of BGB § 361. See WM, 1984, at 1598, 1599.
46 Note that the mere possibility suffices. The law partially establishes an abstract (and thus
nonrebuttable) presumption of speculation under these circumstancees. See Kiimpel, Zum Terminund Differenzeinwand bei Zinsterminkontrakten und Zinsswapgeschaften, WM, 1986, at 661, 662
(arguing for certain modifications) [hereinafter Kiimpel].
47 See WM 1984, 1598, 1599; WM 1965, 766; Kiimpel, supra note 46, at 662.
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ket will be an exchange, but this is not a prerequisite. 8
This definition is very broad. Generally speaking, any futures transaction where the parties do not have to perform their duties immediately
qualify under this definition. If such a B6rsentermingeschiift is present,
the B6rsengesetz denies the enforceability of the contract unless both parties had the "legal capacity to conclude a Bbrsentermingeschiift in a
binding way." 4 9 Section 53 of the Bbrsengesetz prescribes when such
capacity would exist.5 0
Unlike Civil Code section 764, though, it is immaterial to the applicability of the B6rsengesetz.provisions whether or not a transaction was
entered into for hedging purposes. 51 If a party has deliberately fulfilled
its contractual duties, however, it may not reclaim what it has
transferred. 2
Thus, the consequences under the Brsengesetz very much resemble
those of section 764. This comes as no surprise since both statutes
sought to protect the inexperienced investor against speculation. Notice,
however, that section 53 of the B6rsengesetz requires that both parties
have the capacity to conclude a binding futures contract. This means
that if only one party to a transaction did not meet this requirement, and
that party gained in the transaction, the other party could not be forced
to pay even though it had the requisite capacity to conclude the contract.5 3 Typically, the rules affected financial institutions by denying
them the right to recover the loss from a transaction from the investor.
On the other side, a reputable institution would not have been able to
refuse payment to the investor because of its reputation.
Given the above definition, it seems that, by and large, the futures
48 Schwark, B6RSENGESETZ (Commentary, 1976), Einleitung § 50-70, remark 2(c) [hereinafter
Schwark].
49 B6RsG §§ 53, 58 (W. Ger.).
50 See infra text accompanying notes 110-33.
51 WM, 1988, at 1717, 1719; Hiuser in SOERGEL, supra note 33, at § 764, remark 12; Hiuser &
Welter, Nationale Gestaltungsschrankenbei ausldndischen Bi"rsentermingeschdffen, WM, Sonderbeilage 8 1985, at 7 [hereinafter Hdiuser & Welter]. This result does not seem correct, given that both
statutes are aimed at forestalling speculation. The reasons given by the BGH are not very convincing. See Hellwig & de Lousanoff, Die VerbindlichkeitsogenannterHedge-Geschdfte, in FEsTsCHRIFr
FOR E. STIEFEL ZUM 80 GEBURTSTAG 325, 333-37 [hereinafter Hellwig & de Lousanoff]. Notice

that the BGH decision is not superseded by the new law.
52 B6RsG § 55 (W. Ger.). For a comprehensive description of section 55, see Hiuser, Der
Rfickforderungsausschlussnach § 55 B"rsG bei unverbindlichen B'rsentermingeschdften, WM, 1988,
at 1285.
53 Notice, moreover, that the courts are extremely reluctant to override the results under B6RsG
§ 53 on the ground that the other party has acted maliciously. See, e.g., WM, 1980, at 768, 770
(court did not deny a broker the right to refuse to pay an investor what he had gained in a futures
transaction). For further examples, see Bundschuh, Die Rechtsprechungdes Bundesgerichtshofszum
B6rsenterminhandel,WM, 1986, at 725, 730 [hereinafter Bundschuh].
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that are traded in today's world are covered by the Brsengesetz provisions. Yet the Bundesgerichtshof has made it clear that the foregoing
definition is not all inclusive, stating expressly that the court would also
qualify other transactions as "Bbrsentermingeschiifte" if they served the
same economic purpose. 4
b. Structure
If a certain transaction qualifies as a "B 6rsentermingeschift," this is
not the end of the investigation. In order to ascertain the legal treatment
of a particular transaction, one must distinguish further between three
kinds of "BSrsentermingeschiifte"-official, unofficial, and prohibited.
For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that the vast majority of financial futures transactions other than forward contracts on
foreign currencies are considered "unofficial" transactions. This comes
as no surprise if one takes into account that the only futures that qualify
as "official" are those that are traded on a German exchange under the
rules of the respective exchange." Until recently, however, hardly any
financial futures had been traded on a German exchange. It is exactly
this situation that the new German financial futures exchange will
change. In particular, one should note that financial futures traded on
foreign exchanges have been considered "unofficial" by the courts. 5 6
In order to understand fully the legal consequences that arise out of
these classifications, one must keep in mind that the courts and most
legal scholars regard the rules of the B6rsengesetz and Civil Code section
764 as standing independently from each other.5 7 Their respective scopes
are largely overlapping but not congruent. Section 764, for instance, is
not applicable to hedging transactions, whereas this factor seems to be
immaterial under the Brsengesetz provisions. It is merely for practical
reasons that the Bbrsengesetz is most often applied. If the B6rsengesetz
rules do not apply to a particular transaction, however, a party may still
be successful in challenging a transaction under section 764. Thus, there
are two statutory "hurdles" on the way to enforceability whose provisions need to be checked separately.
With this in mind we can now consider the treatment of the various
kinds of "BMrsentermingeschiifte." First, as to prohibited transactions,
54 WM, 1984, at 1598, 1599 (decision concerning stock options).
55 Pecher, supra note 33, § 764, remark 9; Baumbach, Duden, & Hopt, HANDELSGESETZBUCH
(commentary) (27th ed. 1987), vor 50 B6P.sG, remark 3(B) [hereinafter Baumbach, Deden, & Hopt].
56 WM, 1981, at 711; Bundschuh, supra note 53, at 727.
57 WM, 1988, at 1717, 1718; WM, 1985, at 477, 478; Canaris,supra note 37, at remark 1874;
Pecher, supra note 33, at § 764, remark 7; Baumbach, Duden, & Hopt, supra note 55, at § 53,
remark 4; Hellwig & de Lousanoff, supra note 51, at 328.
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such contracts are not enforced even if both parties have the "legal capacity to conclude a binding B6rsentermingeschift." 5' 8
Second, official B6rsentermingeschifte are considered fully valid
provided that both parties have the "legal capacity to conclude a binding
B6rsentermingeschdft." 5 9 Under these circumstances, neither party can
claim that the contract is unenforceable. Moreover, section 58 bars the
application of Civil Code section 764 to such transactions. If, however,
either party lacks the aforementioned capacity, the rules of the Bbrsengesetz, as well as section 764, would apply, thus denying
enforceability.
Unofficial B6rsentermingeschifte are treated like official ones with
regard to their enforceability under the B6rsengesetz. 6 This means that
the crucial question is whether both parties have the legal capacity to
conclude a binding B6rsentermingesch~ift. There is one difference, however, distinguishing unofficial from official Bbrsentermingesch~fte which
is of great practical importance. Section 58 of the Bbrsengesetz does not
bar the applicability of Civil Code section 764 to these transactions.
Thus, even if both parties have the capacity under section 53, the futures
contract will not be enforced pursuant to section 764, provided that the
transaction fulfilled its requirements. 6 1 It is from this situation that section 764 derives most of its practical importance since the B6rsengesetz
does not also deny enforceability. Section 764 is particularly important
for futures transactions on foreign exchanges.6 z
Table 1 attempts to summarize these rules, visualizing them for better understanding.
c.

Legal Capacity to Conclude a Binding Futures Contract

The number of people that the B6rsengesetz empowered to conclude
binding futures contracts was quite limited. 63 Section 53 of the Bbrsengesetz covered only business persons (regardless of whether incorporated or not), provided they were registered in the so-called Commercial
Register ("Handelsregister"). 64 The general result of this provision was
that only people who were engaged in a trade or business which exceeded
58 B6RsG § 64 (W. Ger.); See also Pecher, supra note 33, § 764, remark 12.
59 BioRsG § 53 (W. Ger.).
60 Canaris, supra note 37 remark 1877.
61 Id.; Baumbach, Duden, & Hopt, supra note 55, vor § 50 BoRsG, remark 3(C).
62 See infra text accompanying notes 63-81.
63 See B. Grunewald, Die B6rsentermingeschdftsf' higkeit, WM 1988, 1077 for the legislative
history specifically with regard to this requirement.
64 Registration is not a great matter-only employees or professionals engaged in trade or business need to be registered. See Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) § 1.
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Table 1:

Domestic Financial Futures Transactions (Old Law)
BORSENTERMINGESCHAFTE

prohibited

official

unofficial

both parties had
the § 53 capacity

§ 764 (+)
§§ 52, 53 (+)

§ 764 (-)
§§ 52, 53 (-)

§ 764 (+)
§§ 52, 53 (-)

not both parties
had the above
capacity

§ 764 (+)
§§ 52, 53 (+)

§ 764 (+)
§§ 52, 53 (+)

§ 764 (+)
§§ 52, 53 (+)

Explanation ofsigns: A (+) means that the futures contract was not enforced under that

section; a (-) means it was not affected by that respective section.

a de minimis level along with all corporations 65 were covered by the statute. Therefore, persons professionally ("berufsmassig") engaged in exchange transactions-namely banks, their employees, professionals (e.g.,
lawyers and accountants), and large private investors, no matter how experienced they were-did not fall within section 53 of the Birsengesetz.
This statute, however, did empower people and institutions who did not
have a residence or a branch in Germany, the reason being that the law
did not consider it necessary to protect foreign citizens from the risks of
speculation.
d. Intermediate Summary
Summarizing, there were two chief reason why financial futures
trading in Germany was hampered. First, private investors lacked the
capacity to conclude binding futures contracts due to section 53 of the
B6rsengesetz. Second, a sufficient variety of official financial futures did
not exist. The recent legislation attempts to address the first issue, while
the establishment of a German financial futures exchange, backed by this
legislation, attempts to cope with the second. Whether these are sufficient measures will be discussed later in this Article.
4.

Treatment of Transactionson Foreign Futures Exchanges

Because few financial futures were traded in Germany under the old
statutes, the treatment of foreign transactions in financial futures which
involved a German party became a very important issue. This is illustrated by the number of court decisions on the subject. Generally, the
old law greatly restricted such transactions.
These restrictions were based on the two statutory rules which de65 Cf WM 1981, 711 regarding a "GmbH."
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termined the enforceability of "Brsentermingeschffte:" sections 52 and
53 of the Bbrsengesetz, and Civil Code section 764. Section 61 of the
Bbrsengesetz specifically mandated that sections 52 to 60 of the. Brsengesetz applied to foreign futures transactions. Thus, both parties to a
foreign futures transaction had to have the capacity to conclude a binding futures contract or else such contracts were unenforceable under sections 52 and 53 of the B6rsengesetz.6 6 However, if both parties had this
capacity, then sections 52 and 53 of the Bbrsengesetz did not hinder the
contract's enforcement.
This leaves the restrictions of Civil Code 764. As mentioned earlier,
section 58 of the Brsengesetz generally barred the application of Civil
Code section 764 in this situation. However, the futures transaction in
question had to be "official" for section 58 of the Bbrsengesetz to apply.
The courts constantly held that only a transaction on a German exchange
which had been admitted for trading qualifies under section 58 of the
Bbrsengesetz. 67 This was held even when the foreign exchange used had
equal or similar standards regarding the protection of investors. 68 Therefore, under this strict interpretation of section 58 of the Brsengesetz, the
restrictions of Civil Code section 764 often were held to apply.
These decisions evoked harsh criticism from scholars who argued
that the courts' interpretation discriminated against foreign exchanges.69
This criticism, however, was in vain. Later decisions continued to adhere
to the restrictive holdings.70
The consequences of the above statutes and court holdings was that
one could not enter into a binding futures contract with a German party
unless both parties met the capacity requirement of section 53 of the Brsengesetz and the transaction was entered into for hedging purposes as
required by Civil Code section 764.71 Therefore, one could not conclude
a binding contract with a German party for a speculative futures transaction. 72 Foreign brokers sought to evade this restrictive German law by:
66 Cf Hadding & Wagner, B"rsentermingeschdftean ausldndischenBe"rsen und in ausldndischen
Wertpapieren, WM 1976, 310, 314 [hereinafter Hadding & Wagner]. In addition, BGB § 764 would
normally apply.
67 WM 1972, 178, affirming the Reichsgericht decisions RGZ 76, 371, 372; and 79, 381, 384;
more recent judgments are BGH WM 1987, 1153, 1154; and WM 1981, 758.
68 BGH WM 1981, 711.
69 Schwark, supra note 48, Einleitung §§ 50-70, remark 34; Hadding & Wagner, supra note 66,
at 314. For recent U.S. literature with particular regard to commodity futures, see Rogers & Markham, The Application of West German Statutes to United States Commodity Futures Contracts:An
Unnecessary Clash of Policies, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273 (1988).
70 Cf BGH WM 1981, 711, 712.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 33-66.
72 This is an important exception applied to forward transactions in foreign currencies, which
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(1) suing the German party in the United States and seeking subsequent
enforcement in Germany, (2) including choice of law clauses in the contract, (3) including forum selection clauses in the contract, or (4) requiring arbitration.
None of these measures, however, was a successful means of enforcing a contract in Germany. 73 The German courts asserted that regardless of what law the parties' contract specified, section 61 of the
Birsengesetz required the application of sections 52 and 53 of the B6rsengesetz to foreign transactions.7 4 They further held that Civil Code
section 764 was part of the German ordrepublic as an expression of national social policy and could not be avoided.75 This designation of Civil
Code 764 as part of the ordrepublic has been held not to violate articles
59 and 60 of the EEC treaty.7 6 The German courts also argued that
declaring section 764 to be part of the ordrepublic prevented the circum77
vention of the German protection rules by using a foreign exchange.
The result of these court holdings was that, aside from the case of
forward contracts in currencies, 78 a German party who did not have foreign assets which a foreign court could seize was fully protected against
losses unless he or she had the capacity to conclude binding "Brsenteremingeschdfte" pursuant to section 53 of the Bbrsengesetz and the transaction was entered into for hedging purposes. 79 The German courts were
at least consistent in their holdings by denying enforceability when German investors gained from foreign futures transactions."0
A German investor however, could still bring a suit against a foreign
party in that party's national courts and recover any gains. Thus, a Gertransaction BdrsG § 96(3) treated as "official B~rsentermingeschifte" regardless of where the transaction was conducted. BGH WM 1987, 1153, 1155; Schwark, supra note 48, § 96, remark 5.
73 As to measure (1), see BGH 1975, 676; WM 1984, 1245, 1246; Samtleben, RECirr DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT (RIW) 1975, 501, 502. As to measure (2), see BGH WM 1987,
1153, 1154; WM 1981, 758; WM 1981, 711; WM 1980, 768, 769; WM 1978, 1203. As to measure
(3), see BGH WM 1984, 1245. As to measure (4), see BGH WM 1987, 11153 if the arbitration leads
to a non-application of BGB § 764 or B6RsG §§ 52-53 (for nonrecognition of arbitration clauses in
domestic cases, see B6RsG § 28).
74 BGH WM 1984, 1245, 1246; WM 1980, 768, 769; WM 1981, 711. This seems to be generally
accepted. Cf Hadding & Wagner, supra note 66, at 315; Samtleben, supra note 73, at 502.
75 See BGH WM 1987, 1153, 1154; WM 1978, 1203, 1204 (Teil des "innerstaatlichen Soziallebens"); cf Pecher in Miinchener Kommentar, supra note 33, § 764, remark 26; but see Baumbach,
Duden, & Hopt, supra note 55, BtiRsG § 61, remark 2(C); Hadding & Wagner, supra note 66, at
315; Samtleben, supra note 73, at 502.
76 Soci6t6 G6n6rale Alsacienne de Banque S.A. v. Koestler, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. 3. Rep. 1971,
1981.
77 BGH WM 1987, 1153, 1154; WM 1978, 1203, 1204; WM 1975, 676, 677.
78 See supra note 77.
79 Cf Hiuser & Welter, supra note 51, at 9; Bundschuh, supra note 53, at 729.
80 BGH WM 1980, 768.
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man could collect gains under foreign law and avoid paying losses under
German law. This meant that there was the opportunity for speculation
without risk if one found a foreign broker willing to engage in a transaction and willing to rely on the mere promise of the investor to fulfill a
possible obligation."' While this paradise-like situation was significantly
changed under the new law with respect to financial futures, commodity
futures are still covered.
Table 2 gives an overview of the situation under the old law concerning foreign transactions.
Table 2:

Foreign (Financial) Futures Transactions* (Old Law)
BORSENTERMINGESCHAFrE

both parties had the

§ 53 capacity

Recognition of

§ 764 (+)

§§ 52, 53 (-)

not both parties had
the above capacity

§ 764 (+)

§§ 52, 53 (+)

foreign judgments

No

choice of (foreign) law
clause

No

forum selection clause

No

arbitration clause

No

* Other than foreign currency futures
Explanation of signs: A (+) means that the futures contract was not enforced under that
section; a (-) means it was not affected by that respective section.

C. Legal Treatment of Financial Futures Trading Under the New
Legislation
1.

The Strategic Thrust of the New Legislation

In June 1989, the German parliament passed a new law to govern
financial futures trading in Germany. The official reasoning which accompanies this legislation makes it obvious that the legislation has a
global thrust. The federal government stressed this global objective by
stating in the official reasons that the changes in the law are meant to
81 Hellwig & de Lousanoff, supra note 51, at 311.
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strengthen "the financial center Germany as a whole."'8 2 This global objective is connected to two pivotal developments which affect Frankfurt's
status as an international financial center. The first is the technological
developments which are influencing trading on exchanges, and the second is the creation of the European barrier-free market in 1992.
a. Effect of the Globalization of the Financial Markets
Computerized trading and modern forms of communication have
caused an ever-increasing globalization of financial trading. Investors no
longer need to use domestic facilities to engage in trading. Accordingly,
financial institutions do not have to be located near their customers. For
example, German banks have established branches in places with less
restrictive legislation-such as London or Luxembourg-in order to offer their German clients a full range of services. This trend also implies
that Germany's new legislation is probably not a question of vital importance for German financial institutions, at least not for the larger ones.
Regardless of the changes in the financial markets, these institutions will
always find ways to transact their business.
The globalization of the financial markets, however, presents a vital
challenge to Germany's future role in the field of financial services. If the
German market does not offer a full range of financial investments, then
investors will turn to foreign markets, and German institutions will lose
this profitable area. 3 In addition, given the trend of globalization, it
seems probable that frustrated investors will transfer their financial
transactions to a foreign market where their investment needs are met
and where all their financial matters are handled by one financial institution. It was this long-term threat that motivated the German financial
institutions to push the government towards more liberal legislation.
On the other hand, globalization also offers Germany many opportunities. The Frankfurt financial markets have traditionally been wellequipped with highly skilled staff, and bolstered by a strong domestic
economy and the relative wealth of German citizens. Both of these characteristics should create sufficient domestic demand for financial futures,
and an active Frankfurt market may attract foreign investors who want
to take advantage of the market's opportunities.
The federal government enacted the new legislation in response to
the challenges and opportunities presented by the emergence of com82 Official Reasons for the Changes in the Law Concerning the Exchanges, BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE 11/4177, § A.II.1. [hereinafter Official Reasons] (emphasis added).
83 von Rosen, supra note 6, at 308; Kindermann, supra note 8,at 4.
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puterization and more efficient communication.8 4 Thus, the government
changed the old statutes which hindered German exchanges so that the
exchanges could react to these developments. Physical presence is no
longer necessary for transactions on the exchange. Instead, transactions
can now be executed via computer. As mentioned above, the DTB plans
to have all transactions occur via computer terminals that are linked to
the central computer of the DTB.85
In addition to the above reforms, the new law will also enact a second measure designed to address the trend towards globalization. The
new legislation will allow the determination of the respective value of
financial instruments in a foreign currency 6 or in an artificial unit. Allowing the valuation of an instrument in an artificial unit is necessary for
index futures.
As the official reasons state, these amendments to the law are meant
to address the needs arising out of the globalization of the financial marketplace.8 7 The federal government, however, also adds that equal opportunities exist at other major exchanges which are necessary for
Frankfurt to be competitive. 8 The government's ultimate goal, though,
is to "strengthen Germany as a financial center."8 9
b.

Europe 1992

The second objective which the new legislation addresses is the
changes caused by Europe 1992.90 The German government points out
that the freedom to provide services encompassed in articles 59 and 60 of
the EEC Convention includes the freedom to engage in financial futures
contracts anywhere in the EC free from legal obstacles. 9' The freedom to
provide services, however, does not only affect the freedom of investors
to engage in transactions. Although the federal government does not say
so, the new legislation may actually be concerned with a different aspect
of the freedom to provide services. Viewed from the perspective of the
exchanges, the freedom to provide services also includes the freedom to
84 See Official Reasons, supra note 82, § A.II.3.

85 Kindermann, supra note 8, at 9.
86 The DTB views this as a critical issue. Cf von Rosen, supra note 8, at 308.
87 Official Reasons, supra note 82, B. zu No I1 (Sec. 29) Buchstabe b).
88 Id.; see also von Rosen, supra note 8, at 308.
89 Official Reasons, supra note 82, B. zu No 11 (Sec. 29) Buchstabe b).
90 Official Reasons, supra note 82, § A.II. 1. & § B. zu No I1 (Sec. 29) Buchstabe b).
91 Some doubts regarding this assertion can be raised since the decision in Soci&6 G6n6rale
Alsacienne de Banque S.A. v. Koestler, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1971. In that case, the European
Court of Justice held that German court decisions finding section 764 to be part of the ordrepublic
do not violate articles 59 and 60 of the EEC Convention.

German Futures Trading
10:281(1989)
offer financial futures transactions to citizens anywhere in the EC without being hindered by legal obstacles.
When conducting transactions within Germany, however, Germany's financial institutions would of course be limited by the old statutes. Thus, in order to put German institutions on an equal footing with
their foreign competitors, it was necessary to remove these legal restrictions. In addition, the modification of the legal requirements governing
who can conclude a binding financial futures contract combined with the
possible development of computerized trading and the valuation of financial instruments in foreign currencies or artificial units will enable the
German institutions to seize the new opportunities offered by Europe
1992.
Given the free flow of financial services in 1992 and the fact that
powerful financial centers already exist which could easily meet the entire EEC demand for financial futures,9 2 one might question whether
there is a real need for Germany to have its own financial futures exchange. The German government has not commented on this issue and
has referred only to the goal of strengthening Germany's position as a
financial center with regard to 1992. Nevertheless, some speculation on
this issue may be productive.
There is surely a certain amount of patriotism involved. It is frequently overlooked in the United States that the EEC is not a homogeneous group. Being a financial center or "the financial center" of the EEC
is of major importance because of the growing role which financial instruments and the financial industry play in modem business.
There are, however, more "rational" reasons. The financial services
industry offers a great number of challenging, highly paid jobs that might
either be lost or gained depending on how the financial center prospers.
More importantly, past experience proves that within a given area, the
financial industry tends to gravitate to a single location.9 3 If this is true,
then great risks and opportunities are at stake in Europe 1992. Frankfurt
as a financial center might perish or it might ascend to new heights if it
prevails over its European competitors.
This has to be viewed against the following background. A nation's
financial industry is of critical importance to its economy. The federal
government of Germany has underscored this fact in particular with regard to the financial futures market.9" One result of a Europe without
92 There is already a futures on German Federal Government bonds traded on the LIFFF. FuTURES, Exchanges-Trading,Facts and Figures,No. 13, 1988, at 120.
93 WORLD FIN. MARKETS, Sept. 1988, at 12 (published by Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.).
94 Official Reasons, supra note 82, § A.II.1.
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barriers is that the country in which Europe's financial center is located
can establish the regulatory framework for this pivotal exchange and
thus influence exchanges throughout the entire Community. 9 In light of
this fact, the remarks by the federal government about the need to
strengthen not only Frankfurt but all of Germany as a financial center
have even greater implications.9 6
Evaluating the emergence of a German financial futures exchange in
a more globalized world means that the reforms of Germany's restrictive
statutes are even more important. The following describes the pertinent
changes that will take place.
2.

Changes in the Provisions Relating to Financial
Futures Transactions

The drafted legislation changes a variety of provisions relating to
futures ("B6rsentermingeschifte"). The following comments focus on
the significant changes only.
a.

Broadening of the Scope of Section 50 of the B6rsengesetz

Previously, section 50(1) of the B6rsengesetz mentioned only transactions in negotiable instruments ("Wertpapiere") and goods
("Waren"). 97
Many of the modern forms of financial instruments,
namely index futures, would not literally fall under this section. The
courts have always interpreted the term "Bbrsentermingesch~ift" in a
flexible way, which might indicate that the aforementioned modern
forms of financial instruments would be subject to the provisions of section 50. Despite these indications,9" the federal government chose to repeal the limiting language in order to insure that section 50 embraces
modern forms of financial instruments.
The legislature refrained from defining what constitutes a "Brsentermingeschiift." This was done for the same reasons as in the past: to
give the judiciary the flexibility that is necessary to cope with newly
emerging forms of financial futures. 99
In sum, one could conclude that there will be no material changes,
but only clarifications, as to which transactions will be qualified as "B6rsentermingeshdfte." Thus, the current definition and the criteria that
95 This of course reflects what was previously said concerning the financial center of the Community as a source of national pride.
96 Cf Official Reasons, supra note 82, § A.II. 1. & B. zu No 11 (Sec. 29) zu Buchstabe b).
97 For today's scope, see supra text accompanying note 34.
98 The federal government apparently believes this to be a material change. Cf Official Reasons,

supra note 82, B. zu No 20 (Sec. 50) zu Buchstabe a).
99 Id.
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constitute a "Brsentermingeschifft" as described above will continue to
be applied.
b.

Expansion of the Legal Capacity to Conclude Binding Financial
Futures Contracts

The new law adheres to the basic principles that have governed financial futures in the past. Thus, only certain persons are granted the
legal capacity to conclude binding financial futures contracts. If either of
the parties fails to meet the requirements set forth in section 53, the
courts will not enforce any obligation in connection with a financial futures contract between the parties. A party to such a contract, however,
cannot claim restitution for performance in purported fulfillment of its
contractual obligation."0
As in the past, the statutory determination regarding the capacity to
make binding futures contracts is based primarily on whether the parties
to the contract (including partnerships and corporations) are merchants
registered in the Commercial Register ("Handelsregister"). 01 If a party
is a registered merchant, it can conclude binding futures contracts regardless of whether such contracts are business-related. 102 On the other
hand, if a party does not fall within the scope of section 53, such a party
cannot engage in binding futures contracts even when that party enters
10 3
into the transaction solely for hedging purposes.
The statute requires registration because registration provides substantial legal certainty."° The other party need not be concerned about
the specific circumstances or reasons for the transaction. The fact that
the merchant is registered suffices."15 It is for this reason that, unlike the
old law, the new law treats as a registered merchant any merchant who is
registered but does not actually fulfill the legal requirements of registration. Such a merchant
will be unable to claim the non-binding character
06
1
contract.
of the
While the general intent of the new law is to lessen restrictions, it
expands the protective scope of section 53 in some respects. For example, expanded protection is evident with regard to nonresidents. Cur100 See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
101
102
103
104
105

Cf supra text accompanying note 34.
Official Reasons, supra note 82, B. zu No 22 (Sec. 53).
BGH WM 1988, 1717.
Official Reasons, supra note 82, B. zu No 22 (Sec. 53).
The merchant's registration can be easily checked because the Commercial Register is open to

the public.
106 Official Reasons, supra note 82, B. zu No 22 (See. 53).
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rently, nonresidents do not fall within section 53. 107 The government,
however, thought it unjustifiable to exclude nonresidents from the protection that section 53 purports to grant. 1O They will now be subject to
the same rules as residents.10 9 The new regulations mean that foreign
merchants can conclude binding financial futures contracts, but only if
they satisfy the same registration requirements as are imposed on German merchants.
The following is the centerpiece of the new legislation that will substantially increase the number of people who can engage in financial futures transactions, thus bolstering the market position of the German
financial futures exchange. Under the new section 53(2) of the Bdrsengesetz, private individuals would be able to engage in any form of
financial futures transactions if the other party informed them about the
risks inherent in such transactions. This will be true regardless of
whether the transaction serves speculative purposes. It should be noted,
however, that transactions in commodities are expressly excluded from
this treatment. The current principles will continue to govern these
transactions.1 0
The federal government gives several reasons for the drastic change
in the scope of protection. It mentions that citizens do not need official
supervision when they are given proper information on which they can
base intelligent decisions."1 ' Furthermore, a viable German financial futures exchange would require a strong base of potential customers in order to compete successfully with other international financial centers.
With regard to the general thrust of the legislation,11 2 the latter point
seems to be the principal reason for this nearly diametrical change in a
situation that remained unaffected for roughly a century.
As the most important aspect of the new law, the legal capacity to
conclude binding financial futures contracts by virtue of information will
be the subject of the following detailed analysis.
One party to the contract must be a person with "normal" power to
engage in futures transactions-generally speaking, a financial institution
or a registered merchant-provided that such a merchant is subject to
supervision by the regulatory agencies for banks or exchange members.
The other party (hereafter "the individual") must be informed before the
conclusion of the contract. It is not necessary that there be a specific
107 See supra note 104.

108 Official Reasons, supra note 82, B. zu No 22 (Sec. 53).
109 Id.
110 See Rogers & Markham, supra note 31, at 237 (harshly criticizing these principles).
I11 Official Reasons, supra note 82, B. zu No 22 (See. 53).
112 Cf text accompanying note 82.
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time period between when the individual is informed and the conclusion
of the contract. It suffices that the individual be informed "at the time of
the conclusion of the financial futures contract."1 '3 Once the individual
has been properly informed, he/she need not be informed again for three
years. A minor exception to this rule exists insofar as the individual
must be informed again one year after the initial information transfer.
Thereafter, the individual must be informed after each three-year period
in order to freshen the individual's memory with regard to the risks." 4
The new law appears to require that each party who enters into a
financial futures contract with an individual inform the individual. In
other words, it is immaterial that the individual has already been informed about the risks of financial futures transactions by another person. The three-year period during which a previous party need not reinform the individual does not benefit a new person wishing to contract
with the individual. Given the standardized information on the risks of
financial futures that the statute requires, this does not seem justified. In
terms of risks, the identity of the contractual partner is immaterial. The
statute is fairly clear in this respect, however, referring to "the" contractual partner who must inform the individual." 5
The information must be provided in writing, in a document which
is separate from the financial futures contract, and which contains only
the risk-oriented information. The individual must sign the document.
Regarding the kind of information that must be provided, the new
law details the specific risks about which the individual must be informed
and also provides for the manner in which the individual must be informed. The statute prescribes a standardized form of information
which covers the entire field of financial futures transactions regardless of
the particular risks involved in the specific form that a transaction
takes. 6 The standardized form enumerates the risks about which the
individual must be informed or warned. All of this is true regardless of
whether the contract concerns financial futures transactions on a domestic or a foreign market." 7 Thus, a party will best avoid liability if he or
she adheres to the provisions set forth in the statute. The official reasons
expressly consider it sufficient that the document of information confines
8
itself to the statutory design.1
Now, what kind of information does that statute require? The indi113
114
115
116

See Official Reasons, supra note 82, B. zu No 22 (See. 53).

Id.
See also the last sentence of B6asG § 53 (2) (W. Ger.).
Official Reasons, supra note 82, B. zu No 22 (Sec. 53).

117 Id.

118 Id.
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vidual must be informed that any rights acquired under the financial futures contract may lose all or part of their value. Furthermore, the
individual must be informed that the risk of a potential loss is not determinable and may exceed any collateral that the individual may have provided. The individual must also be told that it is possible that reciprocal
transactions, which are intended to limit or exclude potential risks, either
cannot be conducted at all or can be conducted only at a loss. Finally,
the individual must be informed that the risk of a loss increases if the
individual finances the contract through a credit or if any obligations or
claims arising out of the contract would be computed on the basis of a
foreign currency or an artificial unit.
c.

Effect of the Changes on the Enforceability of
Financial Futures Contracts

The enforceability of a financial futures contract continues to depend on whether both parties have the legal capacity to conclude a binding financial futures contract under section 53 of the B6rsengesetz. In
this regard, there is no change in the legal structure. Given the vast expansion of people who potentially qualify under the new section 53, enforceability will be the rule rather than the exception in the future. 1 9 On
the other hand, the lack of capacity under section 53 will result in an
unenforceable contract, as is currently the case. Generally, this will affect situations which are of little concern.12 In 1988, however, the
Bundesgerichtshof decided that section 53, unlike section 764 of the
Birgerliches Gesetzbuch, also applies to hedge transactions.' 2 ' This led
to the very dissatisfying result of unenforceability, because the merchant,
being in the start-up period of his newly opened business, was not yet
registered in the Commercial Register at the time he entered into the
hedge transaction. This type of result will continue under the new law!
In the more frequent case, in which both parties have the capacity
under section 53 to conclude binding financial futures contracts, the Barsengesetz will not affect the enforceability of the contract. Section 764 of
the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, however, presents a different case. As
mentioned, section 764 is an additional hurdle that must be overcome on
the way to the enforcement of the contract.' 22 Section 58 of the B6rsengesetz bars the application of section 764 in cases in which both par119 This applies only for financial futures. Commodities futures are excluded from the preferential treatment. See BORSG § 53(3) (W. Ger.).
120 Namely, it will affect situations in which individuals have not been informed about the risks.
121 BGH WM 1988, 1717; see supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 28-43; see also Table 1.
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ties have the capacity to conclude binding futures contracts. 123 Under
the old law, however, section 58 of the BWrsengesetz barred section 764
of the Birgerliches Gesetzbuch only in the case of futures that were "officially" traded on a German exchange.12 ' The new law does away with
the distinction between official and unofficial futures, and both types will
enjoy equal treatment.
Table 3 gives an overview of the legal treatment under the new law.
Table 3:

Domestic Financial Futures Transactions Under the
New Law
BORSENTERMINGESCHAFTE

prohibited*

(all) other

both parties have the § 53
capacity

§ 764 (+)
§§ 52, 53 (+)

§ 764 (-)
§§ 52, 53 (-)

not both parties have the
above capacity

§ 764 (+)
§§ 52, 53 (+)

§ 764 (+)
§§ 52, 53 (+)

* No real practical importance
Explanation of signs: A (+) means that the futures contract will not be enforced under
that section; a (-) means it will not be affected by that respective section.

d. Treatment of Transactions on Foreign Futures Exchanges
This question will continue to be important, given the globalization
of the financial markets. Under the current law, which treats foreign
futures transactions as "unofficial," most speculative transactions are unenforceable. 2 Under the new law, financial futures transactions will be
given equal treatment no matter where they take place.126
Nevertheless, the question arises as to what will happen if the German law conflicts with the law of a foreign jurisdiction. Under the old
law, the German statute would prevail regardless of the provisions of the
contract. 127 The new law makes somes changes that, along with the
aforementioned change, will result in a much more liberal treatment of
foreign transactions.1 28 The pertinent section, section 61 of the Bbrsengesetz, has been changed entirely.
123 Supra text accompanying notes 36-43.
124 Supra text accompanying notes 36-43. Table 1 shows the effect of this distinction between
official and unofficial futures transactions.
125 For details, see supra text accompanying notes 49-54; see also Table 2.
126 Cf Official Reasons, supra note 82, B. zu No 26 (Sec. 58).
127 See supra text accompanying notes 44-54; see also Table 2.
128 Official Reasons, supra note 82, B. zu No 27 (Sec. 61).
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In the future, Germany will generally respect the application of foreign law. There is one exception to this rule. Section 61 requires German law to be applied if the following cumulative requirements are
fulfilled: (1) the person against claims are brought does not have the capacity to conclude a binding contract under section 53;129 and (2) such
person, at the time the transaction was entered into, was a resident of
Germany; and (3) such person entered into the contract in German
territory.
Only the people who meet the above requirements will enjoy the
protection of the German laws. 3 ' If foreign law should grant more protection in a particular case, the application of such law will not be
131
barred.
With the changes in the law relating to foreign transactions, the basis for the Bundesgerichtshof's decisions on the nonrecognition of foreign judgments 132 was lost. The Bundesgerichthof based all of its
decisions in this field on the ground that the law on which the parties had
agreed did not have rules equivalent to sections 52 and 53 of the B6rsengesetz or section 764 of the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch. Those decisions
expressed the concern that the protection provided under German law
must not be evaded simply by subjecting the contract to another source
of law. t 33 Of course, it is speculative to predict how the court will decide. To the extent that the new German law will respect the application
of foreign law, the reasonings of the cases decided prior to adoption of
the new law no longer apply. Consequently, the courts should grant recognition and enforcement to foreign judgments, forum selection clauses,
and clauses calling for arbitration. Such clauses could be disregarded
only if the aforementioned exception applies under which section 61 of
the Bbrsengesetz does not respect a foreign law that grants less protection than the German rules. As mentioned above, this will often be the
case in commodity transactions. To that extent, the criticism of the Ger1 34
man court decisions continues to be true.
Table 4 attempts to summarize the aforementioned.
129 Furthermore, that person cannot have the capacity by virtue of information.
130 In particular, commodity transactions will be affected by this exception because the "information model" does not apply to them under B6rsG § 53(3).
131 Official Reasons, supra note 82, B. zu No 27 (Sec. 61).
132 Supra text accompanying notes 44-54; see also Table 2.
133 Cf supra text accompanying notes 45-57.
134 For a detailed and harsh criticism with particular regard to commodity futures, see Rogers &
Markham, supra note 31.
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Table 4:

Foreign Financial Futures Transactions Under the New
Law
B6RSENTERMINGESCHAFrE

both
parties
have the
53
capacity

§ 764 (-)
§§ 52, 53 (-)

not both
parties
have the
above
capacity

§ 764 (+)
§§ 52, 53 (+)

Recognition of
If § 61 exception
If § 61 exception
does not apply
applies

foreign
judgments

Yes

No

choice of
(foreign)
law clause

Yes

No

forum
selection
clause

Yes

No

arbitration
clause

Yes

No

Explanation of signs: A (+) means that the futures contract will not be enforced under that
section; a (-) means it will not be affected by that respective section.

V.

CONCLUSION

Very restrictive laws together with even stricter decisions by the
courts have prevented an active trading of financial futures in Germany
until recently. This situation put Frankfurt at a significant disadvantage
as compared with other major financial centers. Both Europe 1992entailing the freedom of financial services-and the trend towards globalization in the financial markets called for measures to bolster Frankfurt's
position in this regard.
The new legislation does exactly this. It removes most of the legal
obstacles that previously hindered financial futures trading in Germany.
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Concurrently, it substantially improves the atmosphere of foreign financial futures transactions-transactions which have often been affected by
the restrictive laws. Basically, what remains in terms of restrictions is
that the private investor has to be informed of the risks inherent in financial futures transactions. That is not overly burdensome because the law
itself spells out the specific risks of which the individual must be informed, thus providing for sufficient legal certainty.
The financial industry in Germany is determined to take advantage
of this new situation. The plans for a fully computerized German financial futures exchange are complete and the exchange started with its first
product on January 26, 1990. One can be optimistic regarding the prospective economic success of a German financial futures exchange.
Given Germany's domestic economic strength, the German financial futures exchange will be able to generate a sufficiently high trading volume
to make it a success. In fact, so far the trading has been very active.

